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MAGINEPP.EPARJ.NG TO BECOMEA BOOKBINDER.You take

a professional course in the history and theory of binding. You
examine historic books, study their design, read what others
have said about them, see pictures of the tools, even investigate
the chemical composition of the boards. But in this course you
never actually bind a book. When you finish the course, though,
the instructor hands you a piece of paper that says: "Congratulations, you are now a bookbinder." I imagine you'd ask for your
money back.
To our shame, that's how we teach in the legal academy.
This observation is scarcely original. Fifty years ago,Jerome
Frank, perhaps the fiercest critic of the conventional case
method, wrote: "If it were not for a tradition which blinds us,
would we not consider it ridiculous that ... law schools confine
their students to what they can learn about litigation in books?
What would we say of a medical school where students were
taught surgery solely from the printed page? No one, ifhe could
do otherwise, would teach the art of playing golf by having the
teacher talk about golf to the prospective player and having the
latter read a book relating to the subject. "1
Frank wanted students to learn by doing, by working in law
offices, much as medical students learn by working in hospitals.
I propose something much more modest, and therefore more
important, because it is at least theoretically possible to
accomplish what I aim to suggest and develop, with your help:
teaching how to locate; assess, and draw inferences from facts.
A few years ago I concluded that something was drastically
wrong with legal education-perhaps we all come to that con-
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clusion sooner or later-and, more, I became convinced that I
knew the source of the defect: We do not teach or even talk
about the one thing on which lawyers spend most of their time,
namely, ferreting out the facts. I began to talk about this
problem with some of my colleagues, even to the point of
hosting a lunchtime colloquium two years ago on teaching facts.
I can confidently state that my enthusiasm for my discovery
won me no converts.
I then realized that this problem, framed dramatically as
"the failure of legal education," would make a dandy chapter in
a book I have been claiming to be working on for the past ten
years, on the problem oflawyers in America (with my authorial
colleague and good friend Tom Goldstein, now dean of the
Columbia Journalism School). When the opportunity for this
talk arose, I decided finally to take the plunge and to begin to
think systematically about this problem of our failure to talk
about facts. That way I could give this talk and write a chapter
and have two for the cost of one.
Almost as an afterthought, I decided I should make a brief
excursion to the library. I'm old enough now to know that most
of what I think I have dreamed up has already been voiced by
others. So I suppose I should not have been surprised to
discover a literature, albeit a small one, about this very problem.
It's nearly a century old. It is even denominated by a set of
initials, though I think these are perhaps only a few decades old:
EPF, evidence, proof, and facts.
EPF appears to have started with John H. Wigmore early
in the century. (I suppose I should say early in the 20th century,
in case these remarks are actually preserved for another year or
two.) Wigmore was, no doubt, reacting to the case method of
teaching that by the beginning of World War I had certainly
established itself in the American law schools. Wigmore
proposed that something more was needed, not merely an
analysis of legal rules, even if from original sources, but an
analysisof the persuasivepower of the facts themselves.Why do
we accept a statement as fact? What constitutes sufficient
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evidence?What makes a.datum relevant to an issue? Wigmore
devised a complex symbolism, with flow charts, that permitted
the student to map the relationship between facts, and
testimony about facts, and the likelihood that one assertion or
another was true and "proved" some ultimate fact.2
Wigmore, because he was dean of Northwestern, could
mandate that all students take a course in which he taught how
to use his symbolic logic to reason with facts and draw
inferences from them. When he was no longer dean the course
was no longer required, and when he passed from the scene the
course was not taught. Episodically during the intervening
decades, other voices, some of them powerful, have' suggested
that Wigmore's idea, or something like it, must be revivified.
About a quarter century ago, clinical courses gained a foothold
in the legal academy,3 and they may be understood as one
answer to Wigmore's call. My clinical colleagues tell me that
fact issues are now taught to some degree, certainly more so
than in the days when the case method was not merely the
supreme method but the sole method of teaching. Clinical
courses focus on pretrial litigation, trial advocacy, "skills"
courses that teach interviewing (and perhaps negotiation), and
various "live-client" clinics and subject-related workshops.
These courses are important. But they are expensive and they do
not reach very many students. The question I'm posing is whether
we can do for the curriculum what research and writing courses
have achieved during the past two decades. Can we design a
course that will reach every student in the school?
We need to provide this course because the "case-trained
lawyer is in danger of having a distorted picture of the world in
John H. Wigmore, "The Problem of Proof," 8 Ill L.Rev. 77
(1913);}0HN H. WI GMORE, THE SCIENCE OFJUDICIAL PROOF AS
GIVENBYLOGIC,PSYCHOLOGY,ANDGENERALExPERIENCEAND
ILLUSTRATEDIN}UDICIAL TRIALS (3rd ed. 1937).
2
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which the pathological and the exotic obscure the healthy and
the routine."4 Mariana Hogan, the New York Law School
externship director, reports that students sent outto work in law
offices around New York City commonly complain that they
rarely do the "real work" oflawyers. What do they do instead?
Frequently, it seems, they are asked to sort through a file to uncover the facts!Rea/lawyers, they assume, know otherwise. Two
decades ago, a well-known survey of the Chicago bar reported
that only two "skills"of the practicing lawyerare really essential:
"fact gathering" and "the capacity to marshal facts and order
them so that concepts can be applied."5 Commenting in the
early 1990s on this survey, Abraham P. Ordover noted that
what lawyers "do, day in and day out, is investigate, gather,
research, assimilate, and understand the relevanceof facts. This
holds true for responses all across the lines of expertise in the
profession. And yet this fact work is, by and large, not taught in
our law schools."6
Does this inattention to teaching about facts really make a
difference? A half century ago perhaps it did not: when law
school admissions were relatively low most young graduates
received on-the-job training in firms or had the leisure in their
own shops to learn it for themselves, and there was much less
law. The difficulties that arise when schools ignore fact analysis
were less apparent. Today I put it to you that we are verging on
a crisis: After they graduate nowadays, law students do not get
the personal training that their forebears received. The firms
complain about it, the law offices complain about it, and woe
betide the new solo practitioner who has no idea how to
uncover or make much of the facts.
"WilliamTwining,''TakingFacts Seriously," 34] ofLegalEduc.
22, 39 (1984).
F'RANCES KAHN ZEMANS & VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, THE
MAKING OF A PuBLIC PROFESSION 124-5 (1981).
5
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We call the places in which we work Law Schools. What
we really mean is that they are Rules Schools. Law school
teachers suppose, probably without thinking deeply on it, that
they are masters of teaching "legal analysis."But what we really
teach is "rules analysis," not all of analysis. And rules analysis,
in the final analysis, is only a small part of the enterprise. We do
it, I think, because it's easy to do. We don't have to get our
hands dirty. We don't have to go out and look very hard for
anything. It's all in the library or on line. We find the rules; we
find articles about the rules; we find other people's ~omments
about how the rules work or not; and we intuit (we call it
analyzing) their difficulties. We do not get grimy from
researching in the real world.
This was the critique, in part, leveled by the legal realists,
but most of them went off in the wrong direction, still
worrying, in the end, about rules and what accounts for them
and how they are interpreted. The more important question for
our students is how the rules are to be used. One of the most
prescient of the realists, Jerome Frank, did worry about this
question. He described himself as a "fact skeptic,"7 but very few
people have taken him up on the implications of his claims.8
Law schools, in the realists' view, ought to be Schools of Legal
Problem-Solving, not just Schools of Facts or Schools of Psychology. I agree but suggest that we need not be so much
"practice oriented" as "lawyer centered." I'm not concerned
whether we teach the particular narrow technique ofbrieffiling;
the mechanics of practice are not the issue. But the theory of
practice, as it were, is the issue. How a person carries out a
profession ought to be central to our inquiry as teachers in
schools. That says nothing about what we should engage in as
7}EROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND xi (6th

printing, 1963 ed.).
Robert S. Marx, "Shall Law Schools Establish a Course on
'Facts?'," 5 J of Legal Educ. 524 (1953); Irvin C. Rutter, "A
Jurisprudence of Lawyers' Operations," 13 J of Legal Educ. 301
{1961).
8
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scholars on our own. Individual professors should, of course,
feel free to follow the muse, and hats off if they choose to write
about economics or sociologyor literature and law, or about law
simpliciter. But when we consider what we are doing pedagogicallywe must do more and we must do it differently.
To this point I admit that I have been abstract. What facts?
What about facts? We frequently bemoan the state of our
students' knowledge about what we might call "college"facts or
textbook facts. In constitutional law they demonstrate that they
do not know how a bill is enacted or what impeachment means.
In corporations, they do not understand the nature of the
corporation or the stock it issues. We want students to come to
law school with grounding in American government,
economics, and history. We'd like them to know some
psychology and sociology. Ignorance of these fields hampers
efforts to learn many branches of law. But we do not seem to
bemoan a more root ignorance: the ignorance of what the facts
of the particular case are, or how to find them. At least we know
where students can learn history and finance: the story of
"history" may be found in a textbooks. But there are no
textbooks that can give us the "facts" of the cases we discuss
beyond the meager statements contained in the casebooks we
use. Graduate instruction in history presumably teaches the
budding historian how to find the "facts" that will constitute a
history: should we not do the same for the budding lawyer?
Consider an analogy to astronomy. We read that the universe is expanding. This "fact" is retailed to lay audiences in
newspapers and news magazines when an astronomer discovers
a far distant supernova with an unusual red shift. We are not
told how the "fact" gets learned. It is not a fact like the fact that
my car is parked outdoors, becausewe cannot observeit directly.
Therefore it is a deduced or inferred fact, a conclusion drawn
from data. The process of inference isn't given us. It's derived
from smudges on a photographic plate, or lines of numbers in
a statistical table generated by a computer. Can you imagine not
teaching the astronomy student that these are the data bits from
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which the inference to "facts" will become known? Yet that's
not how we teach our law students. Instead, we ignore how the
data bits are to be found and largely overlook how they drive
juries, judges, lawyers, and clients to their conclusions.
These deficiencies deeply affect us. Let me repeat some
stories I have heard over the years from a friend who was once
the director of a legal clinic at a well-known law school. (He
forbids me from naming it.) One year he decided as an experiment to staff the clinic in the evening with well-known
professors at this well-known law school. Here is how the
professors handled their clients' cases.
Client 1. The client wanted a divorce.The lawyer-professor
grilled her extensively about her husband's philandering,
reducing her to tears. At the debriefing he suggested to my
friend, the clinic director, that he had given his client sound
advice about how to shape her pleading, by reciting the ample
evidence of her husband's infidelities. Unfortunately, it turned
out the professor-lawyer did not know the law of the state in
which his law school was located but had in mind instead a
1920s' statute from a different state to aid him in his interrogation of a 1960s' problem. He had the law wrong, although he
was doing what a lawyer should be doing.
Client 2. The client announced that he had to be halfway
across the state the next morning for a court appearance. The
professor-lawyer reached into his pocket and handed the client
$50 and sent him packing. At a debriefing later that evening,
this second professor wanted to know whether the office would
refund the $50. He made absolutely no attempt to find out what
the client's underlying legal problem was.
Client 3. The client lived in a building where electricity for
her and a neighbor was billed to her on a single meter. She
asked the professor-lawyer whether she could be sued if she
withheld from her rent the amount of her neighbor's electricity.
The professor said "yes." That was his whole answer. He did
not ask for the landlord's name or phone number; he had no
instinct to call the landlord and say "cut it out." He did not ask
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about what kind of man the landlord was and whether he would
cave in to pressure.
What's going on here? We see three characteristic errors of
lawyer-professors who do not attend to the real job of solving
a client's problem. The first lawyer had the wrong law. Using
the right law is what we actually teach in the law schools and his
was, of course, an elementary error. The second lawyer did not
bother to ask about the problem. He arrogantly assumed that
something else was at stake. He did not listen to the client or
probe at all. He heard what he wanted to hear. This is a deeper
mistake; one that we rarely dwell on in law school. The third
lawyer did not derive from the given facts an operational plan.
He failed to infer the solution from the factual statement. Here
the professor presumably drew some of the facts out properly,
but he did not draw them all out, and he did not do anything
with them. Instead, he answered like a law school professor. He
was not concerned about being a lawyer but about understanding the theory of the case.
The approach of these three lawyer-professors is characteristic, I submit, of the three ways in which we fail to teach
about facts. First, we think we teach, though we do not do it
well, that the facts we seek will be determined in no small part
by the rules that are implicated in the problem. If you have the
wrong law, as our first professor-lawyer had, then you will look
for the wrong facts. Second, we do not teach students that it
will be their job to probe for facts. Except perhaps for the limited enrollment clinical course, we do not explain how students
can dig for pertinent facts. Third, we do not teach students that
as lawyers they must infer from the facts how to proceed. ·
How can we teach the art of the fact? How can we go
beyond the standard answer that we already teach the art of the
fact when we teach, as we claim to do in all our courses, the art
of analysis?One answerwas given by an experimenter at UCLA
in the early 1950s. A 44-hour summer course consisted of the
following topics: eyewitness testimony; detection of deception;
confessions and interrogation methods; "correlation of proof'
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(we are told to read Commonwealth v. Wentzel, 360 Pa. 137,
61 A.2d 309 (1948), to make this clear); investigative
accounting; photographl:c evidence; medico-legal subjects;
documents; impressions and moulages; ballistics; fingerprints;
spectrographic analysis; blood chemistry; alcohol effect and
detection; sound and recording devices; general investigative
procedures.9 Now there's a potpourri. That's not what I mean
by a course in facts and fact analysis, though some of the items
on the list would undoubtedly be considered in any course we
might devise. What's wrong with this list? The problem is that
it conceivesof the problem of facts as a set of specific tasks and
techniques rather than as a general issue that cries out for its own
analysis.
The issue is the abstraction we call facts that in their
concrete manifestation permeate everything that lawyers do.
Mastering the art of tqe fact requires an underlying skill that
Irvin C. Rutter, a professor at the University of Cincinnati Law
School, in 1961 called the skillof"factmanagement." As Rutter
described it, various tasks of lawyers do not amount to different
skills, but to operations requiring the exercise of the same skill:
"In ordering the chaos, the lawyerproceeds by discovering relationships between initially unrelated segments of the picture
and then placing these relationships in their further relationship
to a total reality, so far as it can be seen."10 Law, in this sense,
is not a separate reality but a
part of the total mass of facts, albeit a special kind of
facts. . . . It is not a denial of the reality of language as a
prime tool of the lawyer to say that with this intimate
identification with the facts, the lawyer goes beyond the
words in which they have been presented to him, penetrates
to the reality behind those words, and emerges with words
as he chooses them to describe the reality as he wants others
Marshall W. Houts, "A Course in Proof," 7].
(1955).
9
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10
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to see it. Of critical importance in guiding this process of
selection and molding is that expertness in relevance to the
purpose sought to be achieved, which is the crux of the "art"
of being a lawyer."

Or, as William Twining, one of the most dedicated students of
the problem, has put it: "[T]he serious study of reasoning in
regard to disputed matters of fact is at least as important and
can be at least as intellectually demanding as the study of
reasoning in respect of disputed questions oflaw. "12
What, then, might such a course comprise? I tentatively
suggest some possibilities, perhaps not ordered particularly
usefully. I hope you will help me add to this laundry list and
suggest how the laundry list can be transmuted into a complete
fashion statement.
First, we must show students how difficult it is to uncover
facts, and how testimony about an event is a "fact" of a very different kind. We can do the hoary demonstration, the one that
sends someone rushing into the classroom and that asks
students to say immediately what they saw. We can also ask the
same question a day or a week later. Moreover, we can tape
these encounters, and students might even realize the taping is
going on. We might wait to see how long it would take for
some student to point out that the recollection is unnecessary
because a tape has captured it all. Of course then we need to
unearth the "facts" from the tape.
Second, we should devise means of permitting students to
efficientlyextract facts from a situation. The "live-client"clinics
do this in an expensive way when each student undertakes to
interview a witness. But we can easilyprovide all sorts of canned
records, transcripts oftestimony, documents, police reports, and
the like, from which the student must sift the relevant and
material from the useless and redundant.
Id. (emphasis in the original).
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Third, we must force students to analyze the nature of facts
and to learn that facts"are like animals. They come not only in
different species but in different genuses and families. For
example, I use a simple exercise in an upperclass writing course
in which students are told they are assistants to the mayor of a
particular town. One of the mayor's key assistants has been
involved in an automobile accident. The assistant is the head of
the Mayor's Campaign against Drunk Driving, among other
things. The students are given a file that consists of transcripts
of an investigator's discussionswith each of the witnesses to and
victims of the accident; the file also contains several newspaper
accounts of the accident. One of the accounts is' headlined:
"Drinking and Driving?" The Mayor's instructions are to write
a memorandum detailing only thefacts. The Mayor specifically
instructs that he does not want to read speculation, rumor, and
innuendo. Of course: it turns out that the transcripts are full of
rumor, speculation, and innuendo. Moreover, the witnesses
disagree on virtually everything. The record is, though,
definitively devoid of any statements or other evidence that
anyone had been drinking. The students have great difficulty
writing this memorandum. They usually keep it very short, and
predictably write in this form: "Mr. Mayor, Witness 1 says X.
Witness 2 says Y," etc. Over the years, I have discovered that
few-less than 10 percent-of the students will tell the mayor
that there is no evidence ofdrinking. When I ask in class after the
papers are turned in why the students omitted this information,
I am invariably told: "That wasn't a fact."
Fourth, we must consider the vastly difficult problem of
assessing and evaluating facts. In this same exercise, students
almost never tell the mayor that the accident itself was routine,
though that is the only conclusion that can be drawn. Again,
students resist, saying that a conclusion is not a fact. Why isn't
it? What is a conclusion, if not a fact, although a different kind
of fact from, say, the fact that the cars crashed, or the
recollection that one car was traveling at 50 miles per hour?
This issue is either the same as, or closely related to, the
problems of inference and proo£ I will not detail those
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problems here, but simply point to a current example: How does
Microsoft's insistence that Internet Explorer be a part of the
Windows operating system "prove" that the company has violated the Sherman Act? What is the connection between
individual facts that allow them to be added up to a larger truth?
How are inferences drawn? When are they valid? What kind of
logic or logics are at work? What is proof, anyway?Is it merely
the subjective reaction of the decision maker, so that we may
appeal to his emotions to get a result? Or is it something else,
and what?
Fifth, we should find better, more direct, and more
structured ways of teaching students how the rules they analyze
are to be used to extract the facts necessaryto make the case, to
avoid a bad result, or to accomplish a particular objective.
Sixth, we must persuade students that the facts are not
merely irreducible elements of the universe, but shards and
flashes of nuance that it is the lawyer's task to assemble into a story
that will achieve the client's end? This last problem, I hope you
will agree, is what allows us, as writing teachers, to claim this
territory for ourselves, and to wrestle with a pedagogy of facts.

*

*

*

There have been powerful objections lodged against the
suggestions that the EPF adherents and I have made. Twining
discusses and answers them in his 1984 summary article,
"Taking Facts Seriously." I will not repeat his listing of the
arguments and his counterarguments. Most criticisms of a
proposed "fact syllabus"boil down to the claim that law schools
have no time to teach "soft" skills or notions rooted in common
sense that have been learned elsewhere. But these criticisms are
almost wholly beside the point: They miss the distinction
between a general skill and a particular practical requirement;
they underestimate the difficulty inherent in the problem; they
radically assume common sense for much that has not yet been
investigated; and they assume without evidence that these
things have been taught elsewhere. Moreover, the tables can be
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turned: After all, isn't rule handling a matter, ultimately, of
common sense? Yet we. spend most of three years on rules
handling, of detecting, understanding, distinguishing, and
applying rules. Why should we do less about fact handling?
To get a flavor of the general objection, consider a short
article in 1955 byJack B. Weinstein, then an associateprofessor
of law at Columbia. He wrote that there was no need of a
separate course on facts because this subject was being (or could
be) taught in its appropriate place in other courses. Weinstein
pointed to three meanings of "facts skills": (1) "the ability to
differentiate between facts which are and are not legally
significant"; (2) "the knowledge of how courses of conduct may
be planned to shape the material facts"; (3) "an awareness of
how evidence of the facts may be gathered and used in
litigation. "13
On the first point He said: "Teaching a law student brought
up on the case method the importance of differentiating the
material from the immaterial would seem to be about as
unnecessary as teaching an infant the importance of milk. The
infant suckles to live, the student reads the facts-and I speak
now of what the writer of the opinion says are the facts-and
learns their relationship to the law in order to survive at the law
school and later .... The case method is uniquely conceivedand
designed to build a foundation for an understanding of the
relationship of facts to law and for skillful handling of facts."14
Weinstein's fallacy is that it is not the student but the lawyerin
the case who had to sort out the immaterial. If the lawyer was
at all skillful, immaterial facts would not appear in the case at
all. True, the lawyers and judges may debate about the
materiality of what remains, but that's not the whole of it.
Weinstein comments: "For myself, if I were satisfied that our
Jack B. Weinstein, "The Teaching of Facts Skills in Courses
That Are Presently in the Curriculum," 7 J ofLegal Educ. 463, 464
(1955).
13
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students were fully trained to know what to look for in the way
oflaw, and, therefore, in the way of fact, it would be enough."15
That's a pretty big "therefore." And, I believe, an illogical one.
On the second point, he said: "Are our law schools doing
any good in [the area of teaching how to shape the facts]? To
ask the question is almost to answer it. Lives there a student so
dense that he leaves the course in contracts without
understanding that an agreement must have consideration or
equivalent if it is to have the legal effect that, presumably, he
wants it to have?"16 "What the student learns explicitly and
implicitly is that he can control the facts in many cases to
minimize the chances of litigation. "17 The fallacy here is that
Weinstein stated an empirical proposition but, dare I say it?,
offered neither evidence nor proof. He was content with a
rhetorical flourish. At least in our era we might well wonder
whether the student knows what the particular "thing" is that
constitutes "legal consideration." Sure, the student knows the
rule, and that's all that Weinstein points to. He avoids the issue
of whether one party's muttered "I'll try to raise the money"
amounts to a binding commitment. The issue for us isn't
whether the student knows that the abstraction "consideration"
is required to cause a legal effect but whether the student
recognizes the abstraction in the flesh amidst a jumble of bones.
On the third point, he said: "What concerns [many
teachers] is the evidence of the facts. Here, as in Plato's image
of the cave, we deal not with the facts, but with the shadows
and reflections of the real world. The problem is how to catch
the few distorted rays oflight available and focus them for the
better education of courts and juries. "18 We might add that such
a focus is needed not just for courts and juries, but for all those
15

Ibid. at 465.

17

Ibid. at 466.

18Id.

affected by the decisions for action for which a client seeks the
lawyer's help. Weinstein says that this teaching is already being
done, in civil procedure and evidence courses (and even in torts
and contracts). He provides a long list of rhetorical questions,
his answers to which are evidently quite different from mine.
He asks, for example, "[w]hat does Hickman v. Taylor and its

progeny mean to a student ifhe has no inkling of investigative
procedure in large corporations and small?"19 Exactly, I say.We
have no way of knowing whether much of what we teach means
anything at all. Furthermore, as the rules have exploded in
number we spend more and more time on that explosion and
less and less, I venture to guess, on the underlying issues.
Now professors may think that they are spending time on
fact analysis.But in a candid moment they would likely say that
the time is mostly by ipiplication. And they can have no
assurance that the implications are being learned. After all, if
implicit time is sufficient, why not spend that time implicitly on
the rules, and explicitly on something else? Why not just
assume knowledge of the rule and ask how a particular problem
would come out? We don't because we believe that explicit
discussion is imperative. No less should we be spending time
explicitly discussing the nature of the facts that constitute the
. legal problem and its solution.
Weinstein says"to a large extent the burden of teaching the
use of facts on trial is ... on the evidence course. Much of the
detail is adverted to during the course. But it is quite true that
the evidence teacher does not purport to teach the art of
advocacy;rather, he emphasizes the rules and some of their psychological, legal, and social geneses and implications. An alert
student will, however, undoubtedly get a good deal of practical
insight from such traditional discussions."20 Why does the
student have to be alert? What about those who are not alert?
Weinstein wrote of an evidence exam he gave "which
19

Ibid. at 468.

20Jbid.

at 469 (emphasis added).

consisted of the rambling story told by a client who had been
injured in an automobile accident." He "asked the class to
outline its investigative steps and the impact of the rules of evidence on the way it would prepare for trial and present the
evidence expected to be revealed by such investigation. The
answers showed a surprising carryover into the practical

world. "21 Apparently, not even Weinstein expected the carryover. Just what is it that we are afraid of that precludes law
schools from delivering instruction on these issues explicitly?
A single course may not make a difference. But a single
course conjoined with a reorientation of other courses might
well. My proposal is, I suggest, the exact parallel to our current
experience with the teaching of writing. Writing was once,
perhaps, supposed to have been taught in the regular courses, or
at least absorbed in them. That didn't work, and almost every
law school today has a formal first-year course in writing and
research. But we are also hearing calls for "writing across the
curriculum"; a single writing course is not enough. For the same
reason, we need "facts across the curriculum," as well as a facts
course. Weinstein asked that those who advocate the teaching
of facts "continue their earnest efforts to educate the teachers of
the usual substantive and procedural courses."22 We need both,
and it is the writing professionals who might best be employed
in the task.
I hope readers will join me in this endeavor. We need now
a lively discussion about ways and means. What new course
might address the art of the fact? What techniques and
problems and readings can spread the inquiry across all the
courses that law schools offer? How can we initiate the
movement toward facts?

Id. (emphasis added).
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THEARTOFTHEFACT
by
Jethro K. Lieberman

Every lawyer must learn to uncover,
assess, and draw inference from facts,
and then assemble them into a compelling narrative. Yet the law schools
habitually fail to instruct their students
in the art of the fact. This lecture is a
plea to rethink this signal failure.

